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1See Dam (1970) and Jackson (1969, 1989) for authoritative accounts of GATT principles and practices.  For a
very useful discussion of the way standards are currently handled in the WTO, see Enders (1996).   
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I.  Introduction
To what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global
efficiency is to be achieved in an interdependent world?  This question is at the center of the debate
over the appropriate scope of international economic institutions such as the GATT (and now its
successor, the WTO), where member-countries are considering proposals that would broaden
GATT’s orientation beyond conventional trade policy measures to include negotiations over labor
and environmental standards.  Such proposals appear to encroach on traditional limits of national
sovereignty, and they raise fundamental questions about the structure of international economic
relations among sovereign states.  An important question therefore concerns the minimal range of
policies over which international negotiations must proceed if global efficiency is to be achieved. 
As currently structured, GATT’s central focus is on the removal of trade barriers to market
access, and its approach to labor and environmental standards is best characterized as somewhere
between “neglect” and “benign neglect.”
1  There are really two dimensions of GATT’s approach to
these issues, and they correspond to (i) the freedom each country has to determine its own domestic
standards (i.e., the range of domestic standards that are GATT-legal), and (ii) the freedom each
country has to respond with trade measures to the (GATT-legal) standards chosen by its trading
partners.  To understand the implications of GATT rules along these two dimensions, it is helpful to
distinguish further between domestic standards that relate to production (e.g., a country’s child labor
laws or its regulations regarding the disposal of industrial waste) and domestic standards that relate
to consumption (e.g., a country’s recycling laws or its regulations controlling the sale and distribution
of the products of prison labor).   In general, countries have broad freedom under GATT’s rules to
determine their own standards, though this freedom is somewhat greater with regard to production
standards than it is with regard to consumption standards.  On the other hand, as far as responding
to the (GATT-legal) standards choices of their trading partners, countries face fairly significant
limitations under GATT rules.     
2Hence, in the high-profile 1991 GATT tuna-dolphin dispute between the United States and Mexico, it was not the
right of the United States to set its own environmental (production) standards with respect to the protection and
conservation of dolphins that was challenged.  What was challenged as GATT-illegal was the decision by the United
States to impose a trade embargo against Mexican tuna imports in response to the environmental standards of Mexico.
Note also that erecting trade restrictions per se in response to the labor or environmental standards of a trading partner
is not GATT-illegal: if the tariff in question is not bound in a GATT schedule, then a country is of course free to raise
the tariff for this (or any other) reason.  And even where the tariff in question is covered by a GATT binding, the
country could still raise the tariff through an Article XXVIII renegotiation, but what would distinguish this from a
unilateral action is that the country would be obligated to make “compensatory adjustments” under which it lowered
other tariffs or else face a “reciprocal” tariff increase from its trading partner.
     
3The right to bring these so-called “non-violation” complaints is provided in GATT Article XXIII, which also sets
out procedures for “violation” complaints.  Non-violation complaints  have proven difficult to carry out in practice,
and from 1947 through 1995 only 14 out of the more than 250 Article XXIII proceedings have centered on such
complaints, and none of these explicitly involved labor or environmental standards (see, for example, Petersmann,
1997, pp. 135-176).  Nevertheless,  as Petersmann (1997, p. 172) explains, the function of non-violation complaints
in GATT is to provide a check on the domestic policy autonomy of member-countries, “...and to prevent the
circumvention of the provisions in GATT Article XXVIII...on ‘Modification of Schedules’ if a member, rather than
withdrawing a concession de jure in exchange for compensation or equivalent withdrawals of concessions by affected
contracting parties, withdraws a concession  de facto.”  In this respect, the impact of the right to bring non-violation
complaints may not be well-measured by the numbers of such complaints actually brought, and in principle this right
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Consider first the case of production standards.  The determination of such standards is
regarded by GATT to be the legitimate domain of each national government.  In effect, then, each
country is free under GATT rules to determine its own labor and environmental standards as they
relate to production processes within its borders, and in particular weak labor or environmental
standards do not constitute a violation of GATT obligations.  This is the first dimension of GATT’s
approach to production standards, and it has implications for the second dimension: the market access
obligations (e.g., tariff bindings) that a GATT member does accept as a result of negotiation may not
be later modified unilaterally in order to respond to the (weak) labor or environmental standards of
a trading partner.
2  Taken together, these two dimensions amount to  “neglect,” but GATT does not
quite stop here, and it is this last element that introduces a “benign” aspect to the neglect of labor and
environmental standards within GATT, at least in principle and as far as GATT’s market access
commitments are concerned.  This last element concerns the general “right of redress” that a
government has whenever it can show that market access commitments which it had previously
negotiated are being systematically offset by an unanticipated change in the policies – any policies,
but including labor and environmental standards – of another GATT member, even if these policy
changes broke no explicit GATT rules.
3  Under a successful “non-violation” complaint, themay restrain governments in their decisions to alter labor and environmental standards just as with domestic policies
more generally.
     
4More specifically, special exemptions from GATT Article I (non-discrimination), Article III (national treatment),
Article XI (which prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions) and other articles are provided under GATT Article
XX, so that for example governments may restrict importation of the products of prison labor and  impose trade
restrictions as necessary to conserve exhaustible natural resources or to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.
These exemptions appear to provide a broad loophole for the reimposition of “disguised” protection, but such use of
Article XX is constrained by the specific circumstances under which it can be applied (recently elaborated in the WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures), and by the ability of trading partners to bring  “violation”
complaints under Article XXIII when they believe the Article XX exemption is being abused for protectionist purposes.
A recent prominent example of an Article XX action that was successfully challenged under Article XXIII was the
(violation) complaint brought by the United States and Canada against EC prohibitions on the importation of hormone-
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complaining country is entitled to a “rebalancing” of market access commitments, wherein either its
trading partner finds a way to offer compensation for the trade effects of its domestic policy change
(typically in the form of other policy changes that restore the original market access) or the
complaining country is permitted to withdraw an equivalent market access concession of its own.
In principle, this last element therefore secures the balance of negotiated market access commitments
against erosion as a result of future changes in labor or environmental standards. 
Consider next the case of consumption standards.  As with production standards, the
determination of consumption standards is also considered by GATT to be the legitimate domain of
each national government, but there is an important difference: whereas the implementation of
production standards typically does not involve direct measures to restrict market access,
consumption standards often require interference with or outright bans on imports that do not meet
those standards, and this in turn will require a government to exercise special exemptions from its
market access obligations.  As such, the introduction of a stringent consumption standard offers
governments a fairly direct route to reimpose, in a “disguised” form,  protection they had previously
negotiated away, and the freedom within GATT rules to set consumption standards is tempered for
this reason.  In effect, then, each country is free under GATT rules to determine its own labor and
environmental standards as they relate to consumption within its borders, but unusually stringent
consumption standards – and more specifically, the trade measures that are introduced to implement
these standards –  may constitute a violation of GATT obligations, if they are deemed to reflect
protectionist motives.
4  While GATT’s rules concerning consumption standards are thus somewhattreated beef.  In this case, the EC (consumption and production) standard was set above internationally recognized
standards, and was deemed to lack a sufficient scientific basis to justify the unusual stringency. 
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less permissive than with regard to production standards when it comes to the freedom countries have
to set their own standards, the freedom to respond to the (GATT-legal) consumption standards of
others is analogous to that for production standards: existing market access obligations can not be
modified unilaterally, but a general right of redress exists if changes in the labor or environmental
standards of a trading partner erode the balance of negotiated market access commitments.  
In essence, then, current GATT rules reflect the primacy of market access concerns in GATT
practice.  As such, these rules are designed to provide governments with a legal framework within
which to make and secure market access commitments, and subject to this they respect the
sovereignty of domestic decisions over labor and environmental standards, as they allow each member
government to choose its own domestic standards without GATT involvement so long as the existing
market access commitments it has made are not undermined by those choices. 
It is the wisdom of preserving this degree of national sovereignty over domestic labor and
environmental policies, while at the same time negotiating successive multilateral agreements to
liberalize world trade, that is now being challenged from various quarters in the United States and
elsewhere in the industrialized world.  In particular, the market access orientation of GATT’s rules
is increasingly seen as unfriendly to labor and environmental causes.  A primary concern voiced by
labor interests and social activists is that working conditions and wages in industrialized countries will
suffer from trade liberalization as a result of increased import competition from countries where labor
standards are weak or not enforced.  Similar concerns are echoed by those who see trade as a threat
to the environment.  It is feared that trade pressures will delay the introduction or enforcement of
stricter standards, and could even fuel a “race to the bottom,” in which the labor and environmental
standards of the industrialized world are compromised in the name of international “competitiveness.”
This fear is perhaps reinforced by GATT’s apparent bias: countries do not violate GATT rules by
pursuing weak labor and environmental standards, and they might violate GATT rules if they pursue
labor or environmental (consumption) standards that are “too stringent.”      
5For example, Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1996) focus on the welfare and terms-of-trade effects of the imposition
of labor standards in the presence of free trade but do not consider the choice of tariff policy, while Srinivasan (1996)
considers whether diversity of labor standards alters the case for free trade but is not concerned with whether trade
liberalization might alter a country’s choice of labor standards.
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These concerns are mounting, and fundamental changes to GATT are being considered as a
result, changes that could lead to a significant loss of sovereignty for national governments.  There
are now proposals to introduce the issue of labor standards directly onto the negotiating agenda of
the WTO, with the purpose of creating a “social clause” for the WTO.  The proposed social clause
would specify a set of minimum international labor standards, and then permit restrictions to be
placed against imports from countries not complying with these minimum standards. With regard to
environmental policies, the WTO has already taken concrete steps to explore ways to enhance the
provisions of GATT dealing with trade and environment: as a result of the Uruguay Round, a WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment was established for the purpose of identifying the relationships
between trade and environmental measures and to make recommendations on whether any
modifications to the provisions of the multilateral trading system are required.  With the WTO already
broadening its traditional scope to study ways to incorporate previously ignored aspects of national
environmental policies and facing proposals for fundamental changes in its approach to the issue of
domestic labor standards, it is a good time to consider the question: How should the issue of
domestic standards be handled in the GATT/WTO? 
We are, of course, not the first to ask this question (see, for example, the influential volumes
edited by Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996).  However, formal analytical results are scarce, and of those
even fewer are concerned directly with the interaction between negotiated reductions in trade barriers
and the choice of domestic standards.
5  Yet it is within the context of sustained negotiations to
liberalize world trade that the need to negotiate international agreements over labor and
environmental standards has been most forcefully raised, and it is from the backdrop of GATT’s
successes in securing low levels of negotiated tariffs on a multilateral basis that the case for adding
such standards to the negotiating agenda of the WTO must be evaluated.  Hence, an understanding
of the interaction between tariff negotiations and the determination of domestic standards seems a
necessary starting point for assessing the claim that these standards will suffer as a result of trade     
6Adopting the specific focus of labor standards and following a partial equilibrium approach, Bagwell and Staiger
(1998) also explore some of the general themes considered here.
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liberalization, and therefore necessary as well for considering how the issue of labor and
environmental standards ought to be approached by the WTO.  In this regard, there is a small but
growing formal literature on the question of  “issue linkage” in trade agreements (see, for example,
Ederington, 1999, and Spagnolo, 1999) in which this interaction is a central concern.  These papers
consider how to structure enforcement provisions when there is a range of policies over which
governments are attempting to cooperate.  In contrast, in this paper we abstract from issues of
enforcement, and consider instead the complementary issue of how to structure negotiations when
the scope of policies over which governments could negotiate is potentially broad.
6 
We explore this issue within a general equilibrium framework in which two countries trade
two goods and governments make decisions over their trade policies (e.g., tariffs) and their domestic
standards (e.g., labor and environmental policies) in pursuit of their own national objectives.  In
modeling government decisions, we follow our earlier work (Bagwell and Staiger, 1996, 1999a and
1999b) representing the objectives of each government as a general function of its local prices and
terms of trade, and extend this approach in order to incorporate the presence of local standards.  The
advantages of this approach are twofold. First, it is very general, being consistent both with the
traditional view that governments maximize national income by their policy choices and with the view
embodied in leading political-economy models that governments are concerned about the
distributional impacts of their policy choices as well.  Second, by representing government objectives
in this way, the channel through which one government’s policy choices affect another government’s
welfare is made transparent.  This helps to clarify both the potential problems that arise when
governments focus their negotiations on tariffs alone and the manner in which various rules of
negotiation may address these problems.   
In understanding the potential problems associated with the choice of local standards and
identifying potential solutions, a key question is whether governments are concerned directly with
the standards choices of their trading partners or only indirectly to the extent that these choices have     
7The GATT tuna-dolphin dispute (see also note 2) may provide a good example in which a global commons
problem was the core issue at stake, and the associated trade effects were secondary.
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important trade effects.  The former would be the case, for example, if environmental standards
affected the extent of cross-border pollution (a non-pecuniary international externality).
7  If there
were no cross-border pollution flows, then governments might still care about the environmental
standards adopted by their trading partners, as a result of the competitive effects that these standards
choices could imply (a pecuniary international externality).  Indeed, such competitive effects might
fuel a race to the bottom, and in this case it is the indirect (trade) consequences of the standards
choices of one country that concerns its trading partners.  
It is clear that where serious non-pecuniary externalities are present (e.g., global warming),
direct international negotiations to address these externalities are warranted.  But it is also true that
in this case the need to involve the WTO is dubious, except perhaps for reasons of enforcement (and
even here the case is not without qualification; see, for example, Roessler, 1998, Ederington, 1999
and Spagnolo, 1999).  The more pressing question for the WTO  is whether and how to handle the
pecuniary externalities associated with the choice of local standards, since these externalities travel
through trade and are therefore inextricably intertwined with the business of the WTO.  Be this as it
may, our main finding established below is that there is no need for the WTO to expand the scope of
its direct negotiations to include local standards such as labor and environmental policies.  We show
instead that the market access focus of current GATT rules is well-equipped to handle the pecuniary
externalities associated with choices over labor and environmental standards, and that with relatively
modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty, not less, GATT’s rules can in principle
protect governments from the inefficiencies generated by these externalities.  
These results are established formally below, but the intuition for them can be readily
described.  In the absence of any form of international agreement, governments will tend to use their
trade policies to restrict trade volumes to inefficiently low levels.  This restricted market access is the
fundamental inefficiency that a trade agreement such as GATT can correct.  However, if an
agreement is negotiated which covers only direct restrictions on trade such as tariffs, the unilateral8
urge to restrict market access will be deflected on to domestic policies such as labor and
environmental standards, whose determination will then be distorted as a consequence of negotiated
tariff liberalization.  While introducing domestic standards directly onto the negotiating agenda could
in principle allow governments to eliminate these new policy distortions, it is not necessary to do so:
once the source of the unilateral incentive to distort domestic standards is understood to derive from
a desire to undermine negotiated market access commitments, governments can maintain the right
to unilaterally determine their own domestic standards without sacrificing global efficiency provided
that they face appropriate restrictions on their choices which offset this incentive.  These restrictions
essentially require only that governments preserve the results of market access negotiations when
setting their domestic standards.  
Hence, governments can achieve efficient outcomes if they continue to use international
negotiations as a forum within which to make market access commitments, and are then permitted
to decide individually on the best national policy mix with which to deliver these commitments.  This
approach is in fact quite close to the logic of existing GATT principles as we have described this logic
above.  There is, however, one essential difference: whereas GATT’s existing rules, and in particular
the prospect of non-violation complaints, secure the balance of negotiated market access
commitments against systematic erosion as a result of future changes in labor or environmental
standards, these rules do not apply symmetrically when a government contemplates changes in
domestic standards which would lead to greater market access for its trading partners.  Our results
therefore imply that, while GATT’s existing rules may fail to deliver efficient outcomes in light of the
labor and environmental policy choices available to governments, an alternative to direct negotiations
over labor and environmental standards is to modify current GATT rules so as to permit governments
to raise their bound tariffs to offset the competitive effects when making changes to labor or
environmental policies that would  increase access to their markets.  The first main message of the
paper is that, with this modification, which amounts to granting governments more sovereignty over
their policy choices, GATT’s rules would deliver globally efficient outcomes.
We stress that there is a key difference between harnessing the logic of GATT’s current9
principles to address the issue of labor and environmental standards and negotiating a social clause.
Under the logic of GATT’s current principles, it can be argued that, from the implicit link created by
the prospect of non-violation complaints, an explicit link should be forged – and indeed that this link
should be strengthened – between a government’s labor and environmental policies and its own
market access commitments.  In contrast, under the logic of a GATT social clause, countries could
face restricted access to the markets of their trading partners if they do not meet a set of minimum
standards, and so an explicit link would be forged between a government’s labor and environmental
policies and the market access commitments of its trading partners.  Our results provide no formal
basis for such a linkage, and this can be viewed as the second main message of our paper: while
current GATT practice may fall short of addressing legitimate problems associated with the choice
of labor and environmental standards, the logic of a GATT social clause is fundamentally flawed. 
More broadly, we interpret our findings as indicating that GATT’s existing principles offer
a compelling solution to a key challenge that is now before the multilateral trading system.  This is
not to say that these principles are necessarily well-reflected in current GATT practice.  There may
well be desirable ways to strengthen GATT practice to bring it more in line with GATT principles.
But our results do offer formal support for the view that fundamental changes in GATT’s approach
are not required to handle the contentious issues of labor and environmental standards.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section presents the basic model and
derives non-cooperative and efficient policy choices within this setting.  The non-cooperative policy
choices are shown to be inefficient, and the source of the inefficiency is interpreted.  Sections III and
IV then consider the efficiency properties of various approaches to negotiation.  In section III we
establish that international negotiations over tariffs alone will lead to inefficient outcomes in the
absence of any restraints on domestic policy choices, and we then formally model and evaluate the
impact of the restraints that GATT’s existing rules place on these choices.  In section IV we consider
how GATT rules could be modified to achieve efficient outcomes.  Finally, section V concludes.  10
II.  The Basic Model
In this section we develop a simple model of international trade within which the essential
inefficiencies associated with unilateral choices of trade and domestic policies may be understood.
With the problems created by unilateral policy choices identified, we then use this model in the
remainder of the paper to characterize bargaining outcomes under alternative negotiating structures.
A.  The Economic Environment 
We begin with a description of the economic environment in which trade takes place.  We
work within a two-sector, two-country perfectly-competitive general equilibrium trade model,
modified to capture the issue of local standards in a straightforward way.  In particular, in addition
to its choice of tariff policy, we allow for the possibility that a government may wish to impose local
standards of various kinds in its economy, possibly reflecting “social concerns,” but possibly also in
an effort to correct any of a number of economic distortions that might arise from externalities
associated with the private production and consumption decisions of its citizens.  The essential
restriction we place on the underlying motives for standards-setting is that these motives reflect local
issues, and not concerns of an inherently global nature.  As we discussed in the Introduction, where
important global (non-pecuniary) spillovers are present, direct negotiations are clearly warranted.
Our formal analysis pertains to standards issues that become a concern to governments as a result of
their trading relationships. 
More specifically, we assume that there are two countries, home (no *) and foreign (*), who
trade two goods, x and y, taken to be normal goods in consumption and produced under perfect
competition.  Let x (y) be the natural import good of the home (foreign) country, and define p/px/py






relative prices may differ across the two countries as a result of the tariff policies of each government.
With t ( ) representing the home (foreign) ad valorem import tariff which we take to be non- t (
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trade are then measured by   ( ).  We interpret   ( ) to be an import tax (import p w 1/p w J>1 J<1     
8The Lerner symmetry theorem ensures that trade taxes or subsidies can be equivalently depicted as applying to
exports or to imports in this two-sector general equilibrium setting.
     
9See Brecher (1974) for a derivation of the production possibilities frontier and the determination of production
in a minimum-wage economy trading in international markets.  Similarly, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1971) analyze
the implications of sectoral wage differentials for an economy’s production relationships.
     
10For instance, if more efficient technologies also produce greater emissions, then tight local emissions standards
may effectively preclude the use of the most efficient technologies in a country.  More generally, the allowable level
of pollution emissions associated with production might also affect production possibilities directly, if for example
emissions levels in one sector alter directly the productive efficiency of the other.  To avoid added complications, we
do, however, assume that any non-pecuniary production externalities of this sort are not so severe as to lead to non-
convexities in the production set.  For notational simplicity, we also rule out the existence of non-pecuniary
externalities between local consumption and production decisions, though these complications could be handled
without changing the thrust of our analysis.
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subsidy) and similarly for  .
8 J(
Production in each country will be determined by relative prices in the economy in light of the
country’s  production possibilities set.  However, a country’s production possibilities set may itself
be affected by the presence of a local production standard, which we represent by the parameter  sq
for the home country and   for the foreign country.  In principle, a local production standard could s
(
q
reflect any government policy that has an impact on the country’s production possibilities frontier.
For example,   might represent the legal minimum (or maximum) working age in the home country, sq
which might reflect social concerns but could affect the home country’s production possibilities
through its impact on home-country labor supply.  Alternatively,   might correspond to a minimum sq
real wage, the maintenance of which might comprise a societal goal but could affect the home
country’s production possibilities under the implied factor-market distortion.
9  Or   might represent sq
the maximum legal emissions level per unit of production in the home country, which might correct
an economic distortion but could affect the home country’s production possibilities through its impact
on the technologies available to home-country producers.
10 
In any event, as we have ruled out the existence of international non-pecuniary externalities
by assumption, the local production standards set by one country will have no direct (i.e., non-
pecuniary) effect on the production (or consumption) decisions of its trading partner.  With a     
11In assuming that   and   are functions, we are abstracting from the possibility of multiple equilibria, and are Qi Q
(
i
thus implicitly placing limits on the kind and degree of distortions that are allowed.  We also abstract from the
possibility that these functions may be non-differentiable.  Similar observations apply to the consumption functions
we define below.  Our analysis can be extended in a natural way to handle these complications while preserving the
flavor of the results presented below. 
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country’s local production standard affecting the shape of its production possibilities frontier, and
with the local relative price determining where on the frontier competitive producers will locate in
light of those standards, production in a country will be determined by both its local relative price and
its local production standard level.  Hence, production standards will “shift” the (general equilibrium)
supply functions of each country, and we therefore represent home and foreign production levels,









Consumption, too, will be a function of both the local relative price and the local production
standard level in a country - the former defining the tradeoff faced by consumers, and the former and
the latter together determining the level and distribution of factor income in the economy - but
consumption will also be influenced by the level of tariff revenue collected  R ( ), which is R (
distributed lump-sum to home (foreign) consumers and which we measure in units of the local export
good at local prices.  Moreover, governments may impose a local consumption standard, which we
represent by   for the home country and   for the foreign country.  In principle, such standards sc s
(
c
might place national restrictions on the consumption of products made in a particular way or
possessing a particular attribute (e.g. a national ban on the consumption of hormone-treated beef).
Again, as we have ruled out the existence of international non-pecuniary externalities by
assumption, the local consumption standards set by one country will have no direct (i.e., non-
pecuniary) effect on the consumption (or production) decisions of its trading partner.  In analogy with
our representation of production standards, we therefore treat consumption standards as additional
shift parameters in the (general equilibrium) consumption functions of each country, and represent











.  Tariff revenue is then defined implicitly for the home country by i0{x,y}
 or  , and similarly for the foreign country tariff R’[Dx(sq,sc,p,R)&Qx(sq,p)][p&p w] R’R(sq,sc,p,p w)13

























each country's tariff revenue an increasing function of its terms of trade under the assumption that
goods are normal in consumption.  Home and foreign national consumption levels are thus given by























, respectively.  i0{x,y}
To complete our characterization of the economic environment, we introduce notation for
imports and exports, so that the trade balance and equilibrium conditions may be expressed.  For the
home country, imports of x are represented as  , while Mx(sq,sc,p,p w)/Cx(sq,sc,p,p w)&Qx(sq,p)
 denotes home-country exports of y.  Foreign country imports Ey(sq,sc,p,p w)/Qy(sq,p)&Cy(sq,sc,p,p w)





that, for any world price, we have
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where we now represent explicitly the functional forms of the local prices.  Finally, the equilibrium




















with market clearing for good y then implied by (1) and (2).  
In summary, given local standards in each country and a pair of tariffs, the equilibrium world
price is implied by (2), and the equilibrium world price and the given tariffs then together determine
the local prices.  In this way, the local standards and tariffs imply local and world prices, and thereby
the levels for production, consumption, imports, exports and tariff revenue.  Finally, we assume that
the standard Marshall-Lerner stability conditions are met, so that an inward shift of the domestic
(foreign) import demand curve results in a lower (higher) equilibrium world price.  We further add
the restrictions that    and  , which ensure that the equilibrium dp/dJ>0>dp (/dJ( M˜ pw/MJ<0<M˜ pw/MJ(
prices do not exhibit the Lerner or Metzler paradoxes.     
12We have argued that this second feature is important for understanding the structure of GATT rules more
generally in Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 1999b), where we observe that it will be preserved in a multi-country setting
under GATT’s principle of non-discrimination.  We also note that additional channels can arise in environments where
markets need not clear (Robinson, 1947) or positive mark-ups exist (Flam and Helpman,1987).
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B. Government Objectives
We next offer a general representation of government preferences.  While it is customary to
represent a government's payoff (i.e., welfare) directly in terms of the underlying choice variables (i.e.,
tariffs and local standards), we choose to represent government objectives in a somewhat different
manner, extending the approach taken in Bagwell and Staiger (1996, 1999a, 1999b) in order to
incorporate the presence of local standards.  To this end, we represent government preferences over
tariffs as preferences instead over the local and world prices that the tariff choices imply for given
local standard levels; similarly, we separate government preferences over local standards into direct
preferences over standards and preferences over the world prices that local standard choices imply
for given tariff levels.  This approach to representing government objectives enables us to isolate the
terms-of-trade externality that tariff and local standard selections generate.  We thus represent the
objectives of the home and foreign governments by the general functions   and W(sq,sc,p(J, ˜ pw),˜ pw)










Notice that each government cares about the policy choices of its trading partner only
indirectly, through the effects that these choices have on world prices.  This structure reflects two
underlying features of the environment set out above.  First, our exclusion of global social concerns
and international non-pecuniary externalities implies that governments have no direct reason to care
about the policy choices of their trading partners.  And second, the nature of international economic
interaction ensures that all indirect effects of a government’s policy choices on the economy of its
trading partner are channeled through world prices.
12  
The only additional structure we place on    and   is that, holding its local price and its W W (
local standards fixed, each government achieves higher welfare when its terms of trade improve:








w>0     
13Given the assumptions that Metzler and Lerner paradoxes are absent, the iso-local-price locus exhibits negative
slope and the iso-world-price locus is positively sloped in Figure 1.
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We illustrate this structure with Figure 1, which depicts iso-local-price and iso-world-price loci as
a function of home and foreign tariff levels given fixed local standards in each country.  With local
standard levels held fixed, an initial tariff pair    is associated with a domestic iso-local-price A/(J,J()
locus,  , and an iso-world-price locus,  .
13  Also depicted is a second iso- p(A)6p(A) p w(A)6p w(A)
world-price locus,  , along which the world price is lower than at point A, indicating p w(C)6p w(C)
an improved terms of trade for the home country.  A reduction in the world price that maintains the
home-country local price is thus achieved (for fixed local standards) with the movement from point
A to B, corresponding to a higher (lower) home-country (foreign-country) import tariff.  We assume
only that the home-country government values the implied income transfer. 
To explore the generality of our representation of government objectives, we note that the
structure imposed on government preferences by (3) states that a government would always strictly
prefer a terms-of-trade improvement which allowed it to provide lump-sum distributions of additional
income to its consumers, if this terms-of-trade improvement could be accomplished without altering
any of the following: (i) the economy’s local relative price and production standards faced by
producers, and therefore the economy’s production decisions; (ii) the level and distribution of factor
income in the economy; or (iii) the economy’s local relative price and consumption standards faced
by consumers.  From a political economy perspective, the assumption that a government would
benefit from a terms-of-trade improvement of this nature seems benign in light of (ii), because the
level and distribution of a country’s factor income is being held fixed as its terms-of-trade improve
under (3).  Indeed, we have argued elsewhere (Bagwell and Staiger, 1996, 1999a) that each of the
major approaches to the political economy of trade policy satisfies an assumption of this nature.  This
assumption would also seem to be satisfied in most environments where a government had a distinct
reason to intervene in the production decisions of the economy, as it might for example if pollution
was a by-product of the production process, because by (i) all production decisions in the economy
are being held fixed as its terms-of-trade improve under (3).  However, this assumption may be more
restrictive in environments where a government has a distinct reason to intervene in the consumption     
14For simplicity, we assume throughout that all policy choices correspond to interior solutions of the relevant
maximization problems.   
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decisions of the economy, as consumption decisions will be affected in the derivative defined by (3),
i.e., national consumption is a function of  .  It is possible, for instance, that negative externalities ˜ pw
associated with consumption of a particular good could be  exacerbated by the added consumption
opportunities that additional tariff revenue affords, and if this effect is sufficiently strong then (3)
might be violated.  Nevertheless, condition (3) can always be checked in specific applications, and
in a broad class of interesting environments it will be met. 
C.  Non-cooperative Policy Choices
We first characterize the non-cooperative Nash policy choices.  If governments do not
cooperate over policies, then for any set of foreign policy choices, the domestic government will
choose its policies to solve:
(I). . MaxJ,sq,sc W(sq,sc,p(J, ˜ pw),˜ pw)


























satisfy the first order conditions associated with (I) and (I*):
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To interpret these conditions, consider (4) and (5), which define the home country’s best-
response policy choices as a function of foreign country policies.  Observing that   gives &[JWp%Wp w]
the impact on home government welfare of a small decrease in    when the home tariff is held fixed, ˜ pw
condition (4) dictates that the home government will set each of its local standards so that the direct
effect on its welfare of a small change in a standard is just offset by the indirect effect on its welfare
that the induced world price movement would imply.  A similar interpretation, applied to the home
government’s tariff choice, holds for condition (5), which dictates that the home government will set
its tariff so that the welfare effect of a small change in the local price induced by a change in its tariff
is just offset by the indirect welfare effect that the world price movement induced by this tariff change
would imply.  Note also that, as    and as   by (3),  condition (5) implies  , so that the 8<0 Wp w<0 Wp<0
home government is induced by the terms-of-trade effects of its policy choices to provide greater
protection to its import-competing sector (and therefore a higher local relative price  ) than it would p
choose to provide based on the local price effects of its tariff choice alone.  Similarly, with   by Wp<0
(5), condition (4) implies that the home government will be induced by the world-price effects of its
policy choices to adopt local standards which are more favorable to its terms of trade than it would
choose to adopt based on the direct impact of these standards on its welfare.  Analogous statements
apply with respect to the interpretations of (6) and (7).
D.  Efficient Policy Choices
We next characterize efficient policy choices.  Any efficient combination of policies,

















































c )     
15For example, changes in   and    which keep    fixed must satisfy  .  Efficiency sq J ˜ pw dJ/dsq’(&M˜ pw/Msq)/(M˜ pw/MJ)
requires that no change in home-government welfare can be induced by such policy changes, or that
, which yields the first equality in (8).   Wsq%Wp[˜ pw×(&M˜ pw/Msq)/(M˜ pw/MJ)]’0
18
policy combinations is defined as the set of solutions to the first order conditions associated with (II),
which with some manipulation can be represented as:

















































Conditions (8) and (9) can be interpreted as  “national” efficiency conditions.  Condition (8)
says that, at an efficient policy combination, any small changes in  ,   and    which together leave J sq sc
the equilibrium world price unchanged (and therefore do not affect foreign welfare) must leave home
welfare unchanged as well.
15  Similarly, condition (9) says that, at an efficient policy combination, any





do not affect home welfare) must leave foreign welfare unchanged as well.  Note from (2) that
unilateral changes in policy mix which leave the equilibrium world price unaltered must also leave
equilibrium trade volumes unaltered.  These conditions therefore ensure that each government is
adopting an appropriate relative utilization of its policies in light of its own preferences and the
equilibrium trade volume.  Condition (10) can then be interpreted as the “international” efficiency
condition, as it ensures that policies are set so that the equilibrium trade volume is indeed efficient.
Consider now the efficiency properties of the Nash equilibrium.  Conditions (4) and (5)
determine the best-response home-country policies to a set of foreign policies, and these two
conditions together imply that (8) will be satisfied.  Likewise, conditions (6) and (7) determine the19
best-response foreign policies to a set of home-country policies, and these two conditions imply that
(9) will be satisfied.  Therefore, conditional on the Nash trade volume,  each government is making
efficient use of its policies.  That is, each government is choosing a policy mix that satisfies its
respective national condition for efficiency.  But conditions (5) and (7) violate (10), and therefore
Nash policies are inefficient because the international condition for efficiency is not met.  Hence the
inefficiency associated with Nash policy choices arises because of inefficient volumes of trade. 
This point can be put more starkly by considering an alternative representation of the essential
strategic interaction when governments set trade and domestic policies non-cooperatively.  Let us
define   as the set containing each domestic import demand schedule,  , that is associated M Mx(p w)
with some domestic policy combination (i.e.,    if and only if there exists a   such Mx(p w)0 M (J,sq,sc)
that  ).  Similarly, let us define   as the set containing each foreign Mx(sq,sc,p(J,p w),p w)/Mx(p w) M ( (




the sets of feasible domestic and foreign import demand schedules defined by   and  , M M ( (
respectively, we may now note that the Nash equilibrium policies when governments simultaneously
and non-cooperatively set their tariffs and domestic standards, as defined by (4) through (7), will
correspond as well to the Nash equilibrium policies in the following Two-Stage Non-cooperative
Policy Game:
Stage 1: The domestic and foreign governments simultaneously select import demand
schedules,   and  , from the sets   and  , respectively, and an Mx(p w) M
(
y (p
w) M M ( (
equilibrium world price and trade volumes consistent with these import demand
schedules are implied.
Stage 2: Each government selects a policy mix to deliver its implied import demand at the
implied world price. 
In this two-stage game, the equilibrium world price and trade volumes are determined in Stage 1, and
in Stage 2 each government is therefore completely insulated from the remaining decisions of its
trading partner.  Consequently, in Stage 2 each government will make efficient use of its policies to
deliver the import volume implied for it as the outcome of Stage 1, and hence (8) and (9) must  be20
satisfied.  But as the only strategic interaction between governments occurs in their Stage-1 selection
of import demand schedules, and as the space of policy vectors for each government is mapped onto
the set of its feasible import demand schedules, the Nash equilibrium selections in Stage 1 must satisfy
(4) and (5) for the domestic government and (6) and (7) for the foreign government, and thus these
selections must deliver the Nash trade volumes defined by (4) through (7) as well.  Otherwise, the
import demand schedules selected in Stage 1 could not be best responses: the domestic (foreign)
government could do better by selecting the import demand schedule implied by the (sq,sc,J)






Therefore, the Nash equilibrium policies of the Two-Stage Non-cooperative Policy Game
correspond to the Nash equilibrium policies when governments instead simultaneously and non-
cooperatively set their tariffs and domestic standards, as characterized by (4) through (7).  From the
structure of the Two-Stage Non-cooperative Policy Game, which by construction channels all
strategic interaction between governments into the determination of equilibrium trade volumes, it is
now transparent that the essential problem when governments choose trade and domestic policies
non-cooperatively is that equilibrium trade volumes are inefficient.
Moreover, equilibrium trade volumes are inefficiently “low” in the sense that each government
must secure additional market access from its trading partner in order to reach a mutually beneficial































where to economize on notation we will henceforth where convenient use     ( ) to denote the T T (21







We now introduce a measure of the change in market access that one country affords another
through its policy choices.  While in principle there are a variety of ways that changes in market
access might be measured (e.g., changes in equilibrium import volumes), we will say that, at a world
price  , one foreign policy vector   provides additional foreign-market access to the domestic ˆ pw T (1
country relative to a second vector of foreign policies    if, at the world price   , foreign import T (2 ˆ pw






















This definition corresponds to the direction in which a country’s policy changes would shift its import
demand curve at a given world price: a country that affords additional (reduced) market access at a
given world price engineers an outward (inward) shift of its import demand curve at that world price.
According to this definition, and given our stability assumptions, a change in foreign policies that
reduced foreign-market access at the initial equilibrium world price   would lead to a rise in  . ˜ pw ˜ pw
Hence, using (3) and (11) and recalling that  , along the home government’s reaction curves any 8<0
small change in foreign policies that serves to reduce foreign-market access at the initial equilibrium
world price must lower home-country government welfare. 
Let us now say that a government secures additional market access from its trading partner
if there exists a world price such that the trading partner’s policy changes provide additional access
to the trading partner’s market (i.e., if the trading partner’s import demand curve shifts out for at least
some world price).  We next proceed to establish that each government must secure additional market
access from its trading partner in order to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.  To show this,
consider an agreement that specifies the domestic and foreign policy vectors  , and suppose (T 0,T (0)
that the foreign policy vector   fails to offer additional foreign-market access relative to  , the T (0 T (N
vector of Nash foreign policies.  Then for any set of home-country policies   specified in the T 0
agreement, we must have     
16The strict inequality reflects the following logic.  Beginning on the domestic reaction curve, with policies
, construct a policy path to the Nash policies,  .  Along this path, as   is adjusted, set   along (T R(T (0),T (0) (T N,T (N) T ( T
the domestic reaction curve.  Envelope arguments ensure that the resulting changes in   have no first-order impact T
on W.  The   changes, however, result in an increase in foreign-market access, causing a reduction in the equilibrium T (
world price and thereby an increase in   (by (11)).      W
     
17If in addition it is assumed that policy changes shift the import demand function in the same direction for all
world prices, then a mutually beneficial trade agreement implies that each government secures additional equilibrium




























































so that the home-country government must be worse off under any agreement which specifies the
foreign policy vector   .
16  A similar argument holds with respect to the foreign government. T (0
Hence, each government must secure additional market access from its trading partner in order to
reach a mutually beneficial agreement.
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Finally, we may inquire into the reasons that governments are led through their unilateral
decisions to restrict market access to inefficiently low levels.  It should come as no surprise that the
terms-of-trade consequences of unilateral policy choices represent one source of inefficiency.
However, we now ask if there are additional distortions in this setting that keep governments from
the efficiency frontier when making unilateral policy decisions.  To explore this possibility, we follow
our earlier work (Bagwell and Staiger, 1996, 1999a, 1999b) and imagine a world in which
governments are not motivated by the terms-of-trade implications of their policy choices, and define

























The political optimum corresponds to the decisions governments would have made had they not been23
concerned with exploiting their power over the terms of trade.  But together (12a) and (12b) satisfy
(8)-(10), and therefore politically optimal policies are indeed efficient.  Thus, terms-of-trade
manipulation is the problem that keeps Nash policy choices from reaching the efficiency frontier.
Of course, the political optimum is just one point on the efficiency frontier.  More generally,
any combination of  policies satisfying (8)-(10) will be efficient, and the efficiency frontier will be
defined by the set of all welfare pairs associated with policy combinations satisfying (8)-(10).  We can
summarize this discussion with:
Proposition 1: Nash policy choices are inefficient, and the incentive to manipulate the terms
of trade is the source of the inefficiency.  This incentive does not distort the
policy mix chosen by each government, but Nash trade volume is inefficiently
low, and each government must secure additional market access from its
trading partner in order to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. 
 As Proposition 1 indicates, the terms-of-trade effects of unilateral policy choices are in fact
the fundamental source of inefficiency that governments can correct through international
negotiations in our formal setup, and it is therefore fair to say that contending with the terms-of-trade
motives of governments is the focus of our subsequent analysis.  Yet real governments rarely discuss
in any explicit way such abstract notions as the terms-of-trade consequences of their decisions, and
the attraction these governments have to international trade negotiations seems in any event to have
less to do with enhancing efficiency than with a simple mercantilist desire for export markets.  It is
therefore worth pausing to interpret the terms-of-trade effects in more familiar terms, lest it be
concluded that our framework, while general, is incapable of capturing the underlying forces at work
in actual trade negotiations.  
In this regard, it is important to observe that the terms-of-trade effects of a government’s
policy choices refer simply to its ability to shift the costs of its policies onto trading partners.  This
cost-shifting will occur, provided only that some of the incidence of a government’s policies are     
18This logic is sometimes raised in discussions of standards and trade policy, though it is not recognized as a terms-
of-trade argument.  For example, in discussing the introduction of a new clean-air standard for gasoline, Roessler
(1998, p. 222) observes: “A problem of WTO consistency would arise, however, if the domestic political constraints
are such that a new standard would secure a parliamentary majority only if domestic gasoline is exempted from the
standard for five years or, to put the issue in political-economy terms, if the cost of reducing pollution is initially borne
only by nonvoting producers abroad.”  On cost-shifting motives and their relation to GATT more generally, see for
example Jackson (1989, p. 19), who observes: “More subtle is the possibility that a national consensus could explicitly
opt for a choice of policies that would not maximize wealth (in the traditionally measurable sense, at least), but would
give preference to other non-economic goals...It can be argued that when a nation makes an ‘uneconomic’ choice, it
should be prepared to pay the whole cost, and not pursue policies which have the effect of unloading some of the
burdens of that choice on to other nations.  In an interdependent world, paying the whole cost is not often easy to
accomplish.”   
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borne by foreign exporters.  Thus, for example, when a domestic government offers protection to an
import-competing industry, some of the costs of that protection will be shifted abroad if foreign
exporters accept lower (f.o.b.) prices for their sales in the domestic market.  When such cost-shifting
does occur, it is natural to expect that governments will be led to distort their policy choices, as they
do not bear the whole cost of their decisions.
18  Consequently, when viewed from the perspective of
cost-shifting, terms-of-trade effects can be seen to represent a natural source of inefficiency
associated with unilateral policy decisions.  At the same time, these effects can also help to provide
an economic explanation for the mercantilist orientation of actual negotiations, for as Proposition 1
indicates, they imply that each government is right to pin its hopes for a beneficial outcome of
negotiations on its ability to gain enhanced access for its exporters to the markets of its trading
partner (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1996, 1999a, 1999b for an elaboration on these points). 
Returning now to the results summarized in Proposition 1, it is clear that direct negotiations






equilibrium policy choices and move to a point on the efficiency frontier.  But can direct negotiations
over tariffs alone be structured so as to generate outcomes on the efficiency frontier as well?  This
is the question to which we now turn.
  III.  Tariff Negotiations, Domestic Policies and GATT Rules
In this section we consider the properties of bargaining outcomes under various negotiating
structures.  We begin in the next subsection by showing that negotiations over tariffs alone will lead     
19Copeland (1990) explores an analogous negotiating structure.  In a setting where governments are assumed to
be national-income maximizers, he shows that tariff negotiations can be beneficial even if other instruments are “non-
negotiable.”  Our emphasis here is different: we simply wish to establish that this negotiating structure can not deliver
governments to the efficiency frontier, and to evaluate why this is so, and we then move on to consider the efficiency
properties of alternative negotiating structures. 
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to inefficient outcomes in the absence of any restraints on domestic policy choices.  We then turn in
the following subsections to the task of formally modeling and evaluating the impact of the restraints
that GATT’s existing rules place on these choices.
A.  Unrestricted Sovereignty over Local Standards
We first consider “unrestricted sovereignty” over local standards.  That is, we suppose that
governments negotiate over tariffs, but that each government retains the unrestricted right to make
unilateral adjustments to its local standards in the future.  In effect, governments are free to cooperate
over tariffs as they see fit, aware that local standards will then be set non-cooperatively.
19  We show
that such unrestricted sovereignty over local standards will lead to inefficiencies: starting from any
point on the efficiency frontier, each government will have a unilateral incentive to manipulate its
standards to reduce market access and enjoy the terms-of-trade benefit.  Thus, the problem with
granting governments unrestricted sovereignty over their local standards is that they will exploit this
sovereignty to reduce their market access to inefficiently low levels.  We now establish this formally.
Here and throughout this section we will follow GATT practice and depict the tariff
commitments that countries make through negotiated agreement as bindings. The tariff bindings that
a country agrees to in a GATT negotiation define the maximal tariff levels that it can legally apply.
The legal right to set tariffs at an applied rate that is lower than the bound rate will be important later
in this section, and so for consistency we allow for this possibility in this subsection as well.
Starting from any negotiated pair of tariff bindings,  , the home government will make (¯ J,¯ J()
use of its unrestricted sovereignty over local standards to solve the following problem:
(III). MaxJ,sq,sc W(sq,sc,p(J, ˜ pw),˜ pw)
s.t. . J#¯ J     
20This observation relies on a slight strengthening of our assumptions.  We assume henceforth that
 is globally concave in  , with an analogous assumption for foreign-government welfare. W(sq,sc,p(J,˜ pw),˜ pw) J
26
Comparing (III) with (I), it is clear that, if the negotiated tariff binding   does not constrain the home ¯ J
government’s (applied) tariff choice, then its policy choices will satisfy the first-order conditions
defining its unconstrained best-response, given by (4) and (5).
20  Otherwise, the home government






























s.t. . J(#¯ J(
Comparing (III*) with (I*), it follows that, if the negotiated tariff binding   does not constrain the ¯ J(
foreign government’s (applied) tariff choice, then its policy choices will satisfy (6) and (7), the first-
order conditions defining its unconstrained best-response.  Otherwise, the foreign government will







With equilibrium domestic and foreign policy choices then determined by the joint solutions
to the relevant best-response functions, we can now state the next proposition:
Proposition 2: When governments are granted unrestricted sovereignty over their local
standards, agreements to reduce tariff levels create an incentive to restrict
market access and manipulate the terms of trade through domestic policy
choices, and therefore tariff negotiations cannot achieve efficient outcomes.
Proof: The proof follows by observing that the domestic policy choices for any tariffs must satisfy
(4) and (6).  Efficiency, on the other hand, requires that conditions (8) through (10) are satisfied.  But
together with (4), efficiency condition (8) implies that the Nash condition (5) must also be satisfied,
while together with (6), efficiency condition (9) implies that the Nash condition (7) must hold.27
Hence, if efficiency conditions (8) and (9) are to hold, all four Nash conditions (4) through (7) must
hold as well.  But as established previously, this then implies that the final efficiency condition (10)
must be violated. QED
Intuitively, any attempt to use tariff negotiations alone to move from the inefficient Nash
equilibrium to a point on the efficiency frontier will simply shift governments’ incentives to
manipulate their terms of trade on to their local standards choices, which will then be manipulated
to reduce market access.  Therefore, if governments negotiate tariff agreements but are granted
unrestricted sovereignty over their local standards choices, inefficiencies will remain.    
B.  GATT Rules: Non-violation Complaints
If the problem with unrestricted sovereignty over local standards is that governments take
advantage of their sovereignty to distort market access to inefficiently low levels, why not simply
restrict their sovereignty to choices over policy combinations that do not reduce market access from
the levels implied by tariff negotiations?  This is the essential logic behind GATT’s rules as they apply
to the domestic policy choices of member governments.  In this and the next subsection we explore
how negotiated GATT bindings, the ability to renegotiate these bindings, and the right to bring non-
violation complaints can interact to address the inefficiencies identified above.
We will attempt to capture the implications of these rules formally in two steps.  First, in this
subsection we will introduce a simple two-stage tariff negotiating structure, in which the role of tariff
bindings and the right to bring non-violation complaints are highlighted.  In this simple structure, non-
violation complaints work to ensure that the level of market access commitments implied by tariff
negotiations is not eroded by subsequent changes in domestic policies.  This framework will serve
to illustrate our main points.  Then, in the next subsection,  we will extend this two-stage negotiating
structure to three stages, so as to allow governments as well the opportunity to renegotiate tariff
bindings as GATT permits.  This extended three-stage negotiating structure  captures an essential
feature of GATT’s rules not captured by our simple two-stage structure, which is that these rules
prevent erosion of the balance (but not necessarily the level) of market access commitments implied28
by tariff negotiations.  We show that our main points arise as well in this more complicated
negotiating environment.









c ) (¯ J,¯ J() ¯ pw
domestic and foreign market access commitments,   and  , respectively, where ¯ Mx ¯ M
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these definitions, we may now formally define the Two-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game.  As tariff










Stage 1: Governments bargain over tariffs, a pair of tariff bindings,   , is determined, (¯ J,¯ J()
and a world price and market access commitments,  ,   and  , are implied. ¯ pw ¯ Mx ¯ M
(
y
Stage 2: Each government is entitled to make unilateral adjustments to its policy mix so long
as (i) its tariff does not exceed its bound level, and (ii) its policy adjustments do not
erode its implied market access commitments.
Stage 1 is meant to correspond to tariff negotiations under GATT’s Article XXVIII bis, e.g.,
a GATT “Round” of tariff negotiations.  Stage 2 reflects the freedom governments have to adjust
unilaterally their trade and domestic policies subsequent to tariff negotiations.  This freedom is
constrained in two ways.  First, the applied tariff that each government implements cannot exceed its
bound rate as determined in Stage 1.  This reflects the legal commitment embodied in a GATT
binding.  And second, governments are prevented from altering their policy mix in a way that would
erode their implied market access commitments from Stage 1.  This reflects the constraint imposed
on each government by the ability of its trading partner to bring a non-violation complaint under
Article XXIII, and thereby to seek redress if it does alter its policies in such a way as to reduce access
to its markets below that implied by the outcome of Stage 1.  In measuring the implied market access
to which governments will be held, we use the definition of market access changes introduced earlier,
and evaluate these changes at the implied world price.  Hence, we assume that the prospect of non-
violation Article XXIII complaints prevents each government from adjusting its policies in Stage 2     
21This presumes that the right to bring Article XXIII complaints extends beyond trade volumes to prices as well.
If market access assurances were simply a matter of assured equilibrium import volumes, then the strong properties
associated with non-violation complaints which we establish below would have to be qualified (see Winters, 1997,
Srinivasan, 1998, and Bagwell and Staiger, 1999b).  However, this presumption finds some support in the legal
arguments surrounding Article XXIII disputes.  For example, a GATT Panel Report regarding the Article XXIII
(violation) complaint brought by the United States and others against the EC “banana regime” stated: “The Hawaiian
producers had expressed their concerns that the EC banana regime was lowering the price of bananas in the free
market, adversely affecting their ability to continue to produce and potentially export bananas.” (WTO, 1999).      
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in a way that would reduce its market access at  , the implied world price from Stage 1.
21 ¯ pw
To determine the properties of this two-stage procedure, consider first the problem that each










government is permitted to adjust its policy mix subsequent to tariff negotiations to solve:
(IV). MaxJ,sq,sc W(sq,sc,p(J, ˜ pw),˜ pw)
s.t. (i). ; and  J#¯ J
(ii). . Mx(sq,sc,p(J,¯ p
w),¯ p
w)$ ¯ Mx
The first-order conditions associated with (IV) define the domestic government’s best-response policy
mix for any set of foreign policies.  Likewise, the foreign-country government is permitted to adjust





























The first-order conditions associated with (IV*) define the foreign government’s best-response policy
mix given a set of domestic policies.  Given a set of recorded standards and a Stage-1 negotiation
outcome, the equilibrium Stage-2 domestic and foreign policy choices will then be determined by the     
22In this regard, the role of non-violation complaints that we highlight here bears a relationship to the well-known
results of Kemp and Wan (1976).  In their classic paper, Kemp and Wan showed how the membership of a customs
union could always be increased in such a way as to raise the national income of member countries without reducing
the national income of any non-member country.  The customs union need only adjust its (common) external tariffs
to neutralize the impact of the addition of new members on the external terms of trade with remaining non-members.
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joint solution to these best-response functions.  






commitments exactly, so that (ii*) holds with equality, then (1) and (2) imply that domestic policies








our stability assumptions, (ii) is satisfied with strict inequality if and only if the associated domestic






c ) ¯ pw
whenever the foreign government chooses to meet its market access commitments exactly, the Stage-
2 problem for the home government may be rewritten as:
(IV’). MaxJ,sq,sc W(sq,sc,p(J, ˜ pw),˜ pw)
s.t. (i). ; and  J#¯ J








Evidently, in this case the prospect of an Article XXIII non-violation complaint against it is sufficient
to prevent the home government from altering its policies subsequent to tariff negotiations in a way
that would improve its terms of trade.  Recalling now from Proposition 1 that terms-of-trade
manipulation is the underlying source of inefficiency that negotiations can correct, and from
Proposition 2 that an agreement on tariffs alone will shift the incentive to manipulate the terms of
trade on to domestic standards choices, it may be anticipated that the ability to bring non-violation
complaints can have an important efficiency-enhancing role.
22  
To explore this role, we ask whether points on the efficiency frontier can be reached with
appropriate Stage-1 outcomes, in light of the Stage-2 adjustments that may be anticipated.  Given an     
23We do not explore conditions for the uniqueness of the Stage-2 Nash equilibrium.  
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existing set of recorded standards, we will say that a policy combination can be implemented under
tariff negotiations if there exists a pair of tariff bindings such that this policy combination corresponds
to a Nash equilibrium in Stage 2 of the Two-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game.
23  











and ask whether, given a set of recorded standards, this efficient policy combination can be
implemented under tariff negotiations.  Associated with this efficient policy combination will be





price which we denote by  .  Suppose, then, that Stage-1 negotiations were to result in a pair of ˜ pwE







would imply a world price  .  Suppose further, for the moment, that   and  , so ¯ pw’˜ pwE ¯ JE$JE ¯ J(E$J(E
that these bindings are set above the tariff levels associated with the efficient policy combination











implemented under tariff negotiations, provided only that at this efficient policy combination we have dW/dJ(<0
and   (i.e., provided that, at this efficient policy combination, each government would be dW (/dJ<0
hurt by a unilateral increase in the tariff of its trading partner).  To see this, note first that it is feasible











in Stage 2.  And second, note that these selections are indeed best-responses, since the resulting
policy choices (a) are efficient, (b) satisfy   and dW/dJ(/[JWp%Wp w]M˜ pw/MJ(<0













and (c) meet the home and foreign market access commitments exactly.  Consequently, to do better
for itself, a government would have to hurt its trading partner by (a), and therefore by (b) would have
to worsen the terms of trade of its trading partner from  , but by (c) would be prevented from doing ¯ pw
so as a result of constraint (ii’) or its foreign-government analogue. 











(i)   and  , and (ii)   and   can be implemented under tariff dW/dJ(<0 dW (/dJ<0 ¯ JE$JE ¯ J(E$J(E     
24This can be seen by noting that, if the home (foreign) government sets its tariff below its best-response tariff, then
we must have   (  ) and efficiency then requires    and  . dW/dJ>0 dW (/dJ(>0 dW (/dJ<0 dW/dJ(<0
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negotiations.  We now consider the nature of these restrictions in more detail, so as to better assess
the limitations associated with attempts to implement efficient outcomes with tariff negotiations.
Consider first the restriction that   and  .  By (3), this restriction will dW/dJ(<0 dW (/dJ<0
certainly be met at the politically optimal policy combination defined by (12a) and (12b), as at this
combination of policies   and hence world price effects alone dictate how one government Wp’0’W
(
p (
feels about a tariff increase by its trading partner.  Clearly, this restriction will be met for a range of
efficient policy combinations around the political optimum as well.  In fact, it is straightforward to
show that a sufficient condition for this restriction to be met by an efficient policy combination is that
the efficient policies require each government to bind its tariff below its best-response tariff.
24  This
first restriction will be met, then, for all efficient policy combinations at which each government
agrees to restrain the unilateral desire to raise its tariff.  Given the nature of GATT bindings (i.e.,
defining a maximal tariff level), a focus on efficient policy combinations that satisfy this property does
not seem particularly limiting.  Therefore, in light of GATT’s approach to tariff bindings, we will
henceforth refer to efficient policy combinations that share this property as efficient combinations of
tariff bindings and standards policies, and we will focus on the feasibility of implementing such
policy combinations under tariff negotiations for the remainder of the paper.
Consider next the restriction that   and  .  To explore the nature of this ¯ JE$JE ¯ J(E$J(E






































where we have used the definitions of   and    and the fact that the implied world price satisfies ¯ JE ¯ J(E
.  As the first expression makes clear, if  , then existing domestic standards are being ¯ pw’˜ pwE ¯ JE$JE     
25This last point relies on a slight further strengthening of our assumptions.  We assume henceforth that
 is globally concave in   and  , with an analogous assumption for foreign-government welfare. W(sq,sc,p(J,˜ pw),˜ pw) sq sc
With this, suppose for example that bindings were set at the efficient tariff levels, and note that in this case the implied
market access commitments would be below the efficient levels.   Suppose as well that the foreign government set the
efficient foreign policies in stage 2.  It may now be seen that the domestic government’s best response can not be the
corresponding efficient domestic policies.  This follows, with global concavity of   in   and  , from Proposition W sq sc
2, which implies that, even with its tariff bound at the efficient level, the domestic government would wish to alter its
standards policies from their efficient levels so as to restrict domestic-market access below the efficient level, and it
could do so in this case without violating its market access commitments.
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set in a way that encourages market access at   relative to the efficient choice of standards. A ˜ pwE
similar interpretation from the foreign country’s perspective holds for the condition that  .  ¯ J(E$J(E
Whether the restriction that   and   will be met depends, therefore, on whether ¯ JE$JE ¯ J(E$J(E
existing standards are being set in a way that encourages market access at   relative to the efficient ˜ pwE
choice of standards.  This will in turn depend on where governments are starting from (the existing
standards levels) and where they wish to go (the particular point on the efficiency frontier).  But the
circumstances under which this restriction will not be met, namely, that governments face the
prospect of tariff negotiations from a starting point in which their existing standards are set in a way
that discourages access to their markets relative to efficient standards policy, seem quite plausible.
Such circumstances would certainly be suggested by Proposition 2.  In this event, in order to achieve
efficient trade volumes through tariff negotiations, each government would have to offer the
appropriate level of market access to its trading partner by agreeing to bind its tariff at a level below
the tariff that would be efficient in combination with its efficient standards choices, and in light of
these bindings the resulting mix of policies could not then achieve efficiency.  And if bindings were
instead set at or above the level of efficient tariffs, the implied market access commitments would be
insufficient to induce governments to select efficient trade volumes.
25  Hence, we interpret this second
restriction as placing more serious limitations on the ability to implement efficient outcomes with tariff
negotiations.     
With interpretations of these restrictions in hand, we now summarize the results of this
subsection with:34
Proposition 3: Consider any efficient combination of tariff bindings and standards policies.
This efficient policy combination can be implemented under tariff negotiations
if and only if existing standards have been set by each government in a way
that encourages access to its markets relative to the efficient standards policy.
It is clear from a comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 that the prospect of non-violation complaints
restricts sovereignty over domestic policy choices in a way that, in some circumstances, can allow
governments to reach the efficiency frontier with tariff negotiations alone.  In this manner, GATT’s
existing rules can be seen to contribute toward a solution to the problems associated with standard
setting while maintaining some sovereignty over standards choices for its member governments.  It
is also clear from Proposition 3, however, that in combination with tariff bindings the prospect of
non-violation complaints does not leave governments with sufficient sovereignty over their policy
choices to reach the efficiency frontier in all circumstances.  We will explore the possibility of
modifications to GATT’s rules that might address these limitations in the penultimate section of the
paper.  Before doing this, however, we turn in the next subsection to consider an important feature
of GATT’s rules not captured by the Two-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game introduced above. 
C.  GATT Rules: Reciprocity
In the Two-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game of the previous subsection, governments are not
permitted to modify their Stage-1 tariff bindings.  In combination with the prospect of non-violation
complaints, this has the effect of ensuring that the level of market access commitments implied by
tariff negotiations will not be eroded by subsequent changes in domestic policy.  In reality, however,
GATT’s rules do provide governments with the right to modify their tariff bindings.  Indeed, the
central function of Article XXIII non-violation complaints is not to prevent governments from ever
modifying their market access commitments, but to induce them to do so explicitly by renegotiating
their bindings under the rules of GATT (see also note 3).  These rules are provided in Article XXVIII,
which sets out the procedures under which a government may lawfully modify or withdraw its tariff
bindings, as well as the rights of its trading partners in this event.  Under these procedures, a
government may choose unilaterally to raise a tariff binding, with the knowledge that its trading35
partners will then be permitted to withdraw reciprocal concessions of their own.  Hence,  while the
tariff bindings that governments negotiate do imply levels of market access commitments, what is
secured by GATT tariff negotiations in light of the ability to renegotiate is not the level but rather the
balance of these commitments, as defined by reciprocity.  In this subsection, we consider an extended
negotiating structure in order to capture this essential feature of GATT’s rules. 
Accounting for the renegotiation provisions of GATT may also be essential for a complete
understanding of the problems faced by governments as they liberalize tariffs under GATT rules and
contemplate their own domestic standards choices.  In fact, GATT legal scholars (e.g., Enders, 1996,
Roessler, 1998) often describe GATT’s renegotiation provisions as an already-available answer to
the perceived conflict between GATT market access commitments and strong labor and
environmental standards.  For example, in discussing possible routes that GATT might consider in
an effort to allow governments greater leeway to respond to the constraints imposed by these race-to-
the-bottom-type issues, Roessler (1998) observes: 
One legal method...would be to permit [governments] to individually vary their market-access commitments
in accordance with those constraints.  That method is already available.  The market-access commitments under the
WTO agreements are made by product (GATT), by sector (GATS), or by entity (Agreement on Government
Procurement).  The schedules of commitments of WTO members therefore vary significantly.  Moreover, WTO
members are entitled to renegotiate their commitments.  Both during the process of negotiating the commitments and
after their acceptance, WTO members thus have the possibility to adjust their trade obligations...However, this
adjustment takes place at the time when market-opening commitments are negotiated or after a renegotiation based
on reciprocity, and therefore maintains the balance of rights and obligations among members.
...Given the right of each member to adjust its market-access commitments to its perception of these issues,
the real issue is whether the WTO members should be able to react to the external repercussions of their own domestic
policy choices by unilaterally withdrawing their market-access commitments or whether they should be able to do so
only by renegotiating their commitments.  A multilateral trade order based on the rule of law cannot but be based on
the principle of renegotiation. (Roessler, 1998, p. 224).
An important question is therefore whether the remaining impediments to efficient outcomes that we
have identified in the Two-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game might be removed once GATT’s
renegotiation provisions are properly accounted for.  This provides a second reason for studying an
extended negotiation structure which incorporates this feature.
As we have argued elsewhere (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a), mutual changes in tariffs that     
26Formally, we say that the changes in trade volumes associated with the change from one policy vector (T 0,T (0)
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remain unchanged.    
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conform to reciprocity – equal changes in import volumes across trading partners –  will leave the
terms of trade unchanged.
26  Hence, Article XXVIII provides each government with the unilateral
right to reduce the level of its market access commitments by raising the level of its tariff bindings,
but the reciprocal actions of its trading partners permitted under Article XXVIII will ensure that this
unilateral right does not extend to altering the terms of trade.  In our earlier paper we explored the
consequences of this rule of renegotiation for negotiated tariff agreements, and showed that it had
the effect of guiding governments in their negotiations toward efficient politically optimal tariffs.
However, we did not explore the possibility that governments would be choosing domestic policies
as well.  By extending the Two-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game considered above to allow for the
possibility of Article XXVIII renegotiation, we may investigate how the results of the previous
subsection and the results of our earlier paper each extend to a richer policy environment. 
 
Formally, we now extend our negotiation structure to three stages with the introduction of
a “renegotiation” stage (corresponding to Article XXVIII) between stages 1 and 2 of the Two-Stage
Tariff Negotiation Game, where any renegotiation satisfies the restriction of reciprocity as outlined
above, and thus results in mutual changes in tariff bindings that preserve the implied world price from
the first stage.  To ensure that the renegotiation process achieves eventual resolution (and in line with
Article XXVIII), we assume that, if governments fail to agree on a renegotiated set of bindings, then
the bindings that are implemented at the end of this stage are those that imply the greatest level of
market access consistent with the restriction of reciprocity and the requirement that no government
is asked to provide greater market access than would be implied by its proposal in the renegotiation
stage.
We start with some definitions.  Given a world price   that is implied by the outcome of the ¯ pw
first stage of negotiations, we will say that a renegotiated pair of tariff bindings satisfies the restriction
of reciprocity if the pair of bindings also implies the original world price.  If in the renegotiation stage37
the domestic government proposes to bind its tariff at   and the foreign government proposes to bind ˆ J
its tariff at  , then we will say that the domestic and foreign governments’ proposed market access ˆ J(

















of reciprocity the binding proposed by one government will define a reciprocal binding for its trading
partner.  We thus define the domestic government's reciprocal foreign binding,






















c ) (ˆ J,J((ˆ J,¯ pw;@)) (J(ˆ J(,¯ pw;@),ˆ J()
restriction of reciprocity.  We may then say that the proposed bindings,   and  , agree if they yield ˆ J ˆ J(
the same pair of bindings along the iso-world-price locus:  .  When the (ˆ J,J((ˆ J,¯ pw;@))’(J(ˆ J(,¯ pw;@),ˆ J()
proposed bindings do not agree, the pair of bindings that is implemented satisfies the restriction of
proposed market access limits if the domestic market access implied under this pair of bindings is no
greater than the domestic government’s proposed market access, and the foreign market access
implied under this pair of bindings is likewise no greater than the foreign government’s proposed
market access.  This final restriction formalizes the idea that neither government can be forced to
provide greater access to its markets than that implied by its own proposal in the renegotiation stage.
With these definitions, we may now formally define the Three-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game.










Stage 1: Governments bargain over tariffs, a pair of tariff bindings,   , is determined, (¯ J,¯ J()
and a world price,  , is implied. ¯ pw
Stage 2: The domestic government proposes a domestic tariff binding,  , at the same time ˆ J
that the foreign government proposes a foreign tariff binding,  .  If the proposals ˆ J(
agree, then they are implemented as the outcome of the negotiation.  If the proposals
do not agree, then the bindings that are implemented as the outcome of the
negotiation are those which imply the greatest market access while satisfying the
restrictions of reciprocity and proposed market access limits.
Stage 3: Each government is entitled to make unilateral adjustments to its policy mix so long
as (i) its tariff does not exceed its bound level, and (ii) its policy adjustments do not
erode its implied market access commitments.38
Effectively, the Three-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game has governments determining the
balance of market access commitments  – and therefore the terms of trade –  in Stage 1 negotiations,
the level of market access commitments in Stage 2 renegotiations, and the policy mix with which each
government will deliver its market access commitments in the unilateral decisions of Stage 3.  We will
say that a policy combination can be implemented under reciprocal tariff negotiations if, given the
existing standards, there exists a    such that the stage 2-3 subgame yields this efficient combination ¯ pw
outcome as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
In the Appendix, we show that an efficient policy combination cannot be implemented under
reciprocal tariff negotiations if this policy combination is not politically optimal.  Intuitively, attempts
to implement an efficient combination of policies that are not politically optimal will fail under
reciprocal tariff negotiations because, at such a policy combination, some country will desire less
trade volume if it can achieve this reduction in trade volume without altering the world price, and the
Stage-2 ability to renegotiate its tariff bindings subject to reciprocity provides it with just such an
opportunity.  We further establish that reciprocal tariff negotiations cannot implement a politically
optimal combination of policies if existing standards have been set by either government in a way that
discourages access to its markets relative to the efficient politically optimal standards policy.  In this
case, the problem is that, in light of the existing standards, the tariff bindings necessary to induce the
efficient levels of trade volume in Stage 2 would prevent governments from achieving in Stage 3 the
politically optimal tariff levels once standards were also adjusted to their politically optimal levels.
Finally, with two additional conditions we establish that reciprocal tariff negotiations can implement
a politically optimal combination of policies if existing standards have been set by each government
in a way that encourages access to its markets relative to the efficient politically optimal standards
policy.  The first condition is that, at the political optimum, each government’s welfare is no less than
the welfare level it could achieve in the absence of negotiations (i.e., in a non-cooperative equilibrium)
if it could simply commit to a unilateral increase (beyond the Nash equilibrium level) in the market
access it offered to its trading partner.  This amounts to a slight additional tightening from our earlier     
27More formally, we assume that the political optimum provides each government with at least as much welfare
as it could achieve in the Two-Stage Non-cooperative Policy Game were it able to select in Stage 1 any point on the
Stage-1 reaction function of its trading partner which left it below its own Stage-1 reaction function.  Assuming that
each government prefers the political optimum to Nash, this first additional condition will be met if the Stage-1
reaction functions of the Two-Stage Non-cooperative Policy Game slope down (i.e., if, starting from a point on its
reaction function, the best response to an outward shift of the import demand schedule of one’s trading partner –
measured at the world price implied by the original policies  –  is to shift inward one’s own import demand schedule
at this original world price), as then committing to a market-opening policy change could only reduce welfare below
the Nash level.  It is easily shown that this condition will also be met if the Stage-1 reaction curves slope up and
countries are not too asymmetric.
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focus on efficient points at which each government is below its best-response tariff.
27   The second
additional condition is that tariffs and domestic standards are sufficiently close substitutes for meeting
market access objectives.  Together, these two additional conditions assure that, when existing
standards encourage market access relative to efficient politically optimal standards, politically
optimal policies may indeed be implemented under reciprocal tariff negotiations.   
Formally, we may now state:
Proposition 4: An efficient combination of tariff bindings and standards policies can be
implemented under reciprocal tariff negotiations if and only if (a) it consists
of a politically optimal combination of tariffs and local standards, and (b)
existing standards have been set by each government in a way that encourages
access to its markets relative to the efficient politically optimal standards
policy.
Proof: (See Appendix).
As with Proposition 3, it is clear from Proposition 4 that the prospect of non-violation complaints
restricts sovereignty over domestic policy choices in a way that can allow governments to reach the
efficiency frontier with tariff negotiations alone, but in combination with tariff bindings the prospect
of non-violation complaints does not leave governments with sufficient sovereignty over their policy
choices to reach the efficiency frontier in all circumstances.  We consider modifications to GATT’s40
existing rules that might address this potential shortcoming in the next section.
IV. Tariff Negotiations and National Sovereignty
Our analysis thus far has identified circumstances under which tariff negotiations structured
along current GATT principles can allow governments to achieve globally efficient trade and
domestic policies.  These circumstances, however, appear to be limited in important ways.  This is
reflected in both Propositions 3 and 4, where an important impediment to achieving globally efficient
policies will arise whenever either government has set the level of its existing domestic standards in
a way that discourages access to its markets relative to efficient levels.  In this section we consider
the source of this impediment in greater detail, in order to identify modifications to GATT rules that
might remove it.
As Propositions 3 and 4 indicate, GATT’s rules can deliver globally efficient outcomes, so
long as two requirements are met: first, governments must be able to secure market access
commitments through tariff negotiations; and second, each government must be able to choose
unilaterally and without external constraints the best way to meet its market access commitments.
We have argued that, once a level of bindings is established, the prospect of non-violation complaints
will secure the balance of the implied market access commitments against erosion as a result of future
changes in either country’s domestic policies.  This is captured by constraints (ii) and (ii*) in (IV) and
(IV*), respectively, which imply that each government is free to adjust unilaterally its domestic
policies in a way that reduces access to its markets if it compensates with a market-access-stabilizing
tariff cut. 
 As discussed above, however, if a government enters tariff negotiations with domestic
standards that discourage access to its markets relative to efficient standards policy (e.g., lax
enforcement of environmental standards in its import-competing sector), then global efficiency will
require this government to make future changes in its domestic policies which in themselves would
increase access to its markets.  In this event, the bindings necessary for this government to achieve
an efficient level of implied market access would later impede its ability to deliver the promised access     
28An alternative would be to allow governments to record intended domestic policies at the start of tariff
negotiations rather than existing domestic policies as our formal negotiation games assume.  In fact, the failure to
implement policy changes that were “promised” at the time of a round of tariff negotiations can be the basis for a non-
violation complaint under Article XXIII (see Petersmann, 1997, pp. 156-157).  However, this solution would introduce
an added strategic element to the choice of standards, which could add a new source of inefficiency (and which would
be absent under the solution proposed above).
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to its markets with an efficient mix of trade and domestic policies, as it would be prevented from
adjusting its domestic policies in a way that increased access to its markets while offsetting these
market access changes with a tariff increase above its bound level.  This is captured by constraints
(i) and (i*) in (IV) and (IV*), respectively, and when either of these constraints binds, the attainment
of globally efficient outcomes is then impeded.  
What is needed to remove this impediment, then, is a way to give governments the freedom
to stabilize their implied market access commitments by raising their bound tariffs, when making
changes to domestic policies that would otherwise increase access to their markets.  Effectively,
granting this additional freedom would amount to eliminating constraint (i) from the last stage of the
two tariff negotiation games we have set out above, and this would eliminate (i) and (i*) from (IV)
and (IV*), respectively.  As a result, this change would eliminate any impediments to achieving global
efficiency that were associated with the features of existing standards.
28
We summarize this observation with a final proposition:
Proposition 5: If governments were granted the freedom to stabilize their implied market
access commitments by raising their bound tariffs, when making changes to
domestic policies that would otherwise increase access to their markets, then:
(i) any efficient combination of tariff bindings and standards policies could be
implemented under tariff negotiations; and (ii) the politically optimal
combination of policies could be implemented under reciprocal tariff
negotiations.
Proposition 5 indicates that the primacy of market access concerns reflected in current GATT rules     
29We note also that, with this modification of GATT’s rules, the restriction that tariffs and domestic standards are
sufficiently close substitutes for meeting market access objectives is no longer needed to establish that the politically
optimal combination of policies can be implemented under reciprocal tariff negotiations.  
     
30For instance, the renegotiation provisions of Article XXVIII might be modified to facilitate the possibility of
offering changes in domestic standards as a “compensatory adjustment” when raising the bound rate of a tariff.
42
can be harnessed to eliminate the remaining inefficiencies associated with standard-setting under these
rules, if governments are given more sovereignty than these rules currently provide to choose the
policy mix with which to deliver their market access commitments.
29   
Notice that the impediment to global efficiency that we have identified under current GATT
rules bears a resemblance to race-to-the-bottom-type fears, under which trade pressures could delay
the introduction or enforcement of stricter labor or environmental standards.  Our analysis therefore
identifies an element of truth in these fears, in that GATT rules may not provide governments with
sufficient flexibility in all circumstances to offset the trade pressures that could otherwise impede the
implementation of efficient domestic standards.  This is the case, even when the flexibility to
renegotiate market access commitments that GATT permits is modeled, as in Proposition 4.
However, in light of the need for added flexibility, our analysis does point to the renegotiation
provisions of GATT as a potentially fruitful area within which to introduce the modifications that
could eliminate this impediment.
30  In this light, our analysis can be viewed as validating GATT’s
continued emphasis on market access concerns, and as pointing to refinements of GATT’s
renegotiation provisions under which governments could better achieve globally efficient trade and
domestic policies.
Also important, however, is a direction in which our analysis does not point, namely, the
direction taken by proposals for the creation of a GATT “social clause.”  As we have observed above,






the efficiency frontier.  But this is not what the social clause envisions.  Instead, under current
proposals, a set of minimum international standards would first be negotiated, and subsequently each
country would be allowed to deny market access to any trading partner that did not meet these
standards.  These proposals reflect an underlying belief that the race to the bottom is fueled by the     
31This can be seen formally by considering how the introduction of a social clause would augment (IV) and (IV*)
and the tariff negotiating games we have set out above.  Under a GATT social clause as currently proposed, countries
would in the first stage negotiate as well a set of minimum international standards  , and then in the final stage (¯ sq,¯ sc)





a short step from the augmented (IV) and (IV*) to see that the introduction of a GATT social clause could not eliminate
the inefficiencies that exist under current GATT rules except in the special case where efficiency required uniform
standards across countries.   
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policy choices of low-standards countries and the trade pressures that these choices exert on the
industrialized world.  Under this logic, the race to the bottom can be stopped by making access to
one’s markets conditional on the standards choices of one’s trading partners.  But while we have
identified an element of truth in the race-to-the-bottom fears under existing GATT rules, the engines
of this race are fueled by the loss in trade competitiveness that would result from a tightening of one’s
own standards, not by greater import competition from a low-standards trading partner.
Consequently, the inefficiency associated with the race to the bottom cannot as a general matter be
eliminated by modifying GATT’s rules to forge a direct link, of the form envisioned under the social
clause, between one’s market access commitments and the choice of standards made by one’s trading
partner.
31  From this perspective, our analysis indicates that the logic of a GATT social clause is
fundamentally flawed.
V.  Conclusion
How should the issue of domestic standards be handled in the WTO?  Our analysis suggests
that GATT’s principles are already well-equipped to address this issue, and that with some
modification these principles could allow governments to attain globally efficient trade and domestic
policies.  The modification would provide governments with the freedom to increase their bound tariff
rates when making changes to their domestic policies that would otherwise increase foreign access
to their markets.  As GATT principles already effectively require governments to grant compensatory
tariff reductions when altering their domestic policies in ways that would erode foreign access to their
markets, these modifications can be viewed as refinements of existing GATT rules that are consistent
with GATT principles.
While in principle our results point toward a relatively simple “fix” for the contentious issue     
32The general difficulty of assessing the trade effects of a given unilateral policy change arises as well in the context
of Kemp-Wan adjustments (see also note 22), and in the context of customs union formation these difficulties have been
discussed by McMillan (1993) and Srinivasan (1997).  Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that these difficulties have
not prevented GATT panels from proceeding in non-violation cases, where the trade effects of domestic policy changes
are precisely what is at stake. 
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of standards in the WTO, in practice there are of course a host of important caveats which must be
borne in mind.  First among these is the “slippery slope” argument that asks of the WTO, “Why stop
at labor and environmental standards?”  To some degree virtually all domestic policy choices of large
economies such as the United States will have implications for export prices in the world economy
and hence could be the subject of an analysis similar to that which we have undertaken here.  Where,
then, should  the WTO draw the line?  Also important is the question of how, given the complexities
of the real world, the trade effects of a given change in domestic standards could be assessed with
any accuracy.
32  These and other arguments might well be offered up against the advisability of
modifying the rules of GATT in the way that our formal results suggest.  
On the other hand, the direct negotiation of a list of minimum international standards and the
subsequent enforcement of a WTO “social clause” is itself an extraordinarily complex task, and not
one which is immune to the “slippery slope” argument.  At the same time, this approach crosses a
boundary of national sovereignty that has served GATT well for 50 years.  Moreover, as we have
observed, there is a key difference between harnessing the logic of GATT’s current principles to
address the issue of labor and environmental standards and negotiating a social clause.  Under the
logic of GATT’s current principles, there exists an implicit link, created by the prospect of non-
violation complaints, between a government’s labor and environmental policies and its own market
access commitments, and we have argued that this link should be strengthened.  In contrast, under
the logic of a GATT social clause, countries would face restricted access to the markets of their
trading partners if they do not meet a set of minimum international standards, and so a direct link
would be forged between a government’s labor and environmental policies and the market access
commitments of its trading partners.  We find no support for the creation of such a linkage in our
formal analysis.  Consequently, our results indicate that, as a means of addressing legitimate problems
associated with the choice of labor and environmental standards under existing GATT rules, the logic45
of a GATT social clause is fundamentally flawed. 
Finally, we mention a couple of interesting issues for future research.  One issue concerns the
potential gap between GATT principles as we have modeled them and GATT practice.  It is possible
that, while GATT principles can serve as we have indicated to deliver governments to the efficiency
frontier, in practice governments may fall far short of this ideal.  Hence, efforts to bring GATT
practice more in line with GATT principles (by, for example, enhancing enforcement of GATT rules)
may be an important element of handling the issue of domestic standards within the WTO, and this
may therefore provide an interesting further line of research.  A second observation, in light of our
results here, concerns the handling of intellectual property rights protection within the WTO.  One
result of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was a new agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).  Under the TRIPs agreement, WTO members have accepted
obligations on minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property rights and their
enforcement, much as the proposed social clause would introduce for labor standards.  An interesting
question is whether there are special features associated with the protection of intellectual property
(e.g., non-pecuniary externalities) that would warrant such an approach in this case.  We leave these
and other topics for future research.     46
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4:
In the Three-Stage Tariff Negotiation Game, the first stage is significant only in its
determination of the implied world price,  .  Given this world price, governments make second- ¯ pw
stage proposals,   and  , where the unspecified arguments reflect existing ˆ J’ˆ J(¯ pw;@) ˆ J(’ˆ J((¯ pw;@)
standards.  Given that the iso-world-price locus is upward sloping in the    plane, with trade J&J(
volume decreasing monotonically along this locus as tariffs rise, the second-stage proposals determine
the second-stage outcome as follows:
˜ J(¯ pw;@)/max(ˆ J,J(ˆ J(,¯ pw;@)); ˜ J((¯ pw;@)/max(ˆ J(,J((ˆ J,¯ pw;@));

































Finally, in the third stage, the domestic government chooses   to solve (IV), where   and (J,sq,sc) ¯ J’˜ J
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Consider now an efficient combination of tariff bindings and standards policies,











combination constraints (ii) and (ii*) must hold with strict equality, with the associated multipliers



























For suppose this were not the case, and suppose in particular that at this efficient policy combination
the home country’s constraint (ii) held with strict inequality.  Then with   set at  , it would be J JE
feasible for the home country to alter   and   from their efficient levels so as to reduce domestic- sq sc
market access and still satisfy (ii), and home welfare could be strictly improved in this fashion by
Proposition 2 (see also note 25), and so this policy combination could not solve (IV).  Observe also47
that if (ii) and (ii*) hold with equality, it follows from (1) and (2) that  , where    denotes ¯ pw’˜ pwE ˜ pwE
the equilibrium world price associated with the particular efficient policy combination under






































combination to be implemented under reciprocal tariff negotiations is that
(A1). ;  ; and  .   ¯ pw’˜ pwE ˜ J(˜ pwE:@)’˜ JE ˜ J((˜ pwE;@)’˜ J(E
We now prove in sequence the three results contained in Proposition 4: I) If an efficient policy
combination is not politically optimal, then it cannot be implemented under reciprocal tariff
negotiations; II) If an efficient policy combination is politically optimal but the existing standards of
either government discourage market access relative to the efficient politically optimal standards
policies, then this policy combination cannot be implemented under reciprocal tariff negotiations; and
III) If an efficient policy combination is politically optimal and the existing standards of each
government encourage market access relative to the efficient politically optimal standards policies,
then this policy combination can be implemented under reciprocal tariff negotiations 











politically optimal combination, and suppose that this combination can be implemented under
reciprocal tariff negotiations.  Then, given the existing standards, there exists    such that the stage ¯ pw
2-3 subgame yields this efficient combination outcome as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, by (A1) we must have  , with the outcome of Stage 2 characterized by  ¯ pw’˜ pwE ˜ J(˜ pwE:@)’˜ JE
and  , so that in Stage 3 and at the efficient choices, constraints (ii) and (ii*) hold with ˜ J((˜ pwE;@)’˜ J(E
strict equality and the associated multipliers are strictly positive.
From (10), it may now be derived that an efficient policy mix satisfies   . sign{Wp}’sign{W
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p (}
Thus, if  , then  , and (8) and (9) imply further that    and  .  Given Wp’0 W
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our supposition that the efficient combination is not the politically optimal combination, it must be48
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simplicity, we take the former case, wherein the domestic (foreign) government prefers a higher local
price and thus less (more) trade, given  .   ˜ pwE
In this case, given that the multipliers associated with constraints (ii) and (ii*) in (IV) and
(IV*) are strictly positive at the efficient policy combination, if the foreign government makes a
Stage-2 proposal consistent with  , then the home government can profit by deviating ˜ J((˜ pwE;@)’˜ J(E
from a Stage-2 proposal consistent with   to the proposal   .  To see this, note first ˜ J(˜ pwE:@)’˜ JE ˆ J’˜ JE%,
that the home-government’s deviant proposal will be pivotal, and so if the resulting world price is not
altered from   under this deviation, then the home government achieves less trade volume at a ˜ pwE
fixed world price and hence, with  , it will gain from such a deviation.  And in fact, given that Wp>0
the multipliers associated with (ii) and (ii*) are strictly positive at the efficient policy combination,










the resulting world price will indeed not be altered from  .  Hence, with a profitable deviation now ˜ pwE
described, we may conclude that, if an efficient policy combination is not politically optimal, it cannot
be implemented under reciprocal tariff negotiations. 
II) Suppose next that the efficient combination is the politically optimal combination











way that discourages access to its markets relative to the efficient politically optimal standards
policies.  Suppose that it is the existing standards of the domestic government that discourage market
access relative to efficient politically optimal levels.  Suppose further that such a policy combination





associated politically optimal trade volumes and world price.  Then   and   are defined, ˜ Jpo ˜ J(po






















observe that  .  Clearly, by constraint (i) in (IV) we must also have  .  But then Jpo>˜ Jpo ˜ J(˜ pwpo;@)$Jpo
, and hence by (A1) this policy combination cannot be implemented under reciprocal ˜ J(˜ pwpo;@)>˜ Jpo
tariff negotiations.49
III) Suppose finally that the efficient combination is the politically optimal combination











encourages access to its markets relative to the efficient politically optimal standards policies.  Then
 and  .  Suppose now that Stage-1 negotiations imply the politically optimal world Jpo#˜ Jpo J(po#˜ J(po
price ( ), and that the home and foreign governments make politically optimal proposals in ¯ pw’˜ pwpo
Stage 2 given by   and  , respectively.  Then the necessary condition (A1) for ˆ J’˜ Jpo ˆ J(’˜ J(po
implementing the politically optimal policy combination under reciprocal tariff negotiations is
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a Nash equilibrium to the Stage-3 subgame.  To see this, note that if, say, the foreign government






home government selects its policies to solve (IV’).  But with (ii’) preventing an improvement in the
home country’s terms of trade beyond  , the best the home government can do is to achieve its ˜ pwpo
ideal position along this iso-world-price locus, and hence its politically optimal level of welfare, by






What remains in order to establish that the political optimum may indeed be implemented
under reciprocal tariff negotiations in this case is to show that the home proposal   is a best- ˆ J’˜ Jpo
response to the foreign proposal    (and vice versa) in Stage 2.  We consider the home ˆ J(’˜ J(po
proposal, and note that analogous arguments apply for the foreign government.  We begin by
observing that, to improve upon its politically optimal payoff, the home government must secure a
favorable movement in its terms of trade, and hence by (IV’) it must induce a Nash equilibrium of the
Stage-3 subgame in which the foreign government makes policy selections in Stage 3 which satisfy
the foreign market access constraint (ii*) with strict inequality.  Hence, the possible gain to the home
government in deviating from the politically optimal Stage-2 proposal   comes from placing the ˆ J’˜ Jpo
foreign government in a position in Stage 3 where its implied market access commitment is below that
consistent with its best-response policies, and therefore it must be that (6) – which defines the foreign
best-response standards –  is satisfied in the Nash equilibrium of Stage 3.  There are then two cases50
to consider, corresponding to whether or not the foreign constraint (i*) binds in the Nash equilibrium
of the Stage-3 subgame. 
If (i*) holds with strict inequality, then the foreign government is setting its best-response
tariff in Stage 3 so that, in addition to (6), (7) also holds.   As the domestic constraints (i) and (ii) are
inequality constraints, the home government cannot be held above its best-response policies in Stage
3, but may be held below them by its Stage-2 proposal.  Consequently, in this case, with its Stage-2
deviation the home government may engineer a move from the political optimum to a point that rests
on the foreign government’s reaction curves and below its own reaction curves (i.e., a tariff below
its best-response tariff and/or market-access provision above that consistent with its best-response
policies).  But this can yield the home government no greater welfare than it could achieve in the
Two-Stage Non-cooperative Policy Game were it able to select in Stage 1 of this game any point on
the foreign Stage-1 reaction function that left the home government below its Stage-1 reaction
function, which we have assumed is in turn no better than the home government’s politically optimal
payoff.  Hence,  deviating from the political optimum in this case cannot be profitable.  
Finally, suppose that (i*) holds with strict equality in the Nash equilibrium of the Stage 3
subgame.  In this case, the foreign government is held below its best-response tariff by the tariff
binding implied by the home government’s deviant proposal, though as (ii*) is satisfied with strict
inequality the foreign government is still unconstrained in the Nash equilibrium of the Stage-3
subgame by its Stage-2 market access commitment.  The potential additional benefit afforded to the
home government from the ability to bind the foreign tariff may be understood to derive from the
impact of this binding on the foreign government’s market-access determination in Stage 3.
However, a foreign tariff binding will be ineffective in significantly influencing this determination if
tariffs and standards policies are sufficiently close substitutes for meeting the market access
objectives.  Consequently, with sufficient substitutability as we have assumed, the additional
possibility of binding the foreign government’s tariff that comes with this second case cannot make
a deviation from the political optimum profitable.   QED51
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Figure 1: The world- and local-price effects of a tariff change.